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Psychoactive Drug Use in
Evolutionary Perspective
Randolph M. Nesse* and Kent C. Berridge
Pure psychoactive drugs and direct routes of administration are evolutionarily novel
features of our environment. They are inherently pathogenic because they bypass adap-
tive information processing systems and act directly on ancient brain mechanisms that
control emotion and behavior. Drugs that induce positive emotions give a false signal of
a fitness benefit. This signal hijacks incentive mechanisms of “liking” and “wanting,” and
can result in continued use of drugs that no longer bring pleasure. Drugs that block
negative emotions can impair useful defenses, although there are several reasons why
their use is often safe nonetheless. A deeper understanding of the evolutionary origins
and functions of the emotions and their neural mechanisms is needed as a basis for
decisions about the use of psychoactive drugs.
The neural mechanisms that regulate emo-
tion and behavior were shaped by natural
selection to maximize Darwinian fitness, so
psychoactive drugs that disrupt those mech-
anisms should impair adaptation. As the
toll of substance abuse tragically demon-
strates, they can. But psychoactive drugs
can also improve adaptation in some cir-
cumstances (what would many scientists do
without caffeine?), relieve the symptoms of
mental disorders, and induce pleasures that
can sometimes be safe. Here, we consider
substance use and abuse from the perspec-
tive of Darwinian medicine, the enterprise
of seeking evolutionary explanations for de-
sign characteristics that make organisms
vulnerable to disorders (1–3). This perspec-
tive suggests that explanations of substance
abuse based on brain mechanisms or on
individual and social differences can be aug-
mented by evolutionary explanations for
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maladaptive effects of psychoactive drugs,
and for the functions of emotions they
influence.
Emotions are coordinated states, shaped
by natural selection, that adjust physiolog-
ical and behavioral responses to take ad-
vantage of opportunities and to cope with
threats that have recurred over the course
of evolution (4, 5). Thus, the characteris-
tics and regulation of basic emotions
match the requirements of specific situa-
tions that have often influenced fitness.
Emotions influence motivation, learning,
and decisions and, therefore, influence be-
havior and, ultimately, fitness (6–10).
Subjective feelings offer a window (often
distorted) into motivation, but they are
not the essence of emotion (9, 11, 12) and
are not even always a necessary compo-
nent (13, 14). For example, in a recent
study of a forced-choice task, normal peo-
ple start to avoid the poor choice and to
show emotion-associated skin conduc-
tance changes even before they become
aware of any preference (15). Nonethe-
less, subjective positive or negative va-
lence is a prominent aspect of basic emo-
tions, with distinct kinds of negative states
outnumbering positive ones. These obser-
vations are consistent with the origins of
emotions as specialized states shaped to
cope with situations that involve opportu-
nities or gains and a greater number of
different kinds of situations that involve
threats or losses. This offers a potential
evolutionary explanation for the nonin-
tuitive, but well-documented, relative in-
dependence of positive and negative affect
(16), and suggests that the effects of psy-
choactive drugs on positive and negative
emotions should be considered separately.
Drugs that Stimulate
Positive Emotions
Substance abuse is explained, according to
folk psychology, by human tendencies to
repeat behaviors that bring pleasure or re-
lieve suffering. This global explanation is
correct but incomplete. Most drugs of abuse
act on ancient and remarkably conserved
neural mechanisms, associated with positive
emotions, that evolved to mediate incen-
tive behavior. Heroin, cocaine, alcohol,
marijuana, amphetamine, and their syn-
thetic analogs activate mesolimbic dopa-
mine-containing neurons and associated
opioid receptors in mammalian brains, a
system that may be a “common neural cur-
rency” for reward and a substrate for regu-
lating motivations (17–21). Some of the
transmitter molecules used by these systems
evolved as much as 1000 million years ago
(22), and mammalian dopamine, serotonin,
and norepinephrine neurotransmitters are
also used by invertebrate phyla, such as
mollusks and arthropods, that diverged from
prevertebrate lines roughly 600 million
years ago. Most vertebrate brains have m
opioid receptor-like DNA sequences (23),
and even nonmammalian vertebrate brains
have mesolimbic systems comprising dopa-
mine-containing neurons that ascend from
the midbrain to a dorsal and ventral striatal
complex (24). Although these neurotrans-
mitter systems may not all serve the same
functions, some neurotransmitters play sim-
ilar roles in very different organisms: Dopa-
mine mediates feeding in organisms ranging
from slugs to primates (25), and a similar
molecule, octopamine, mediates the effects
of sucrose rewards in bees (26). This con-
servation of function for reward-signaling
chemicals contrasts with a diversity of re-
ceptors (27, 28), probably because a muta-
tion that changes a transmitter is likely to
disrupt a whole system, whereas gene dupli-
cation allows differentiation of receptors
that can gradually take on new functions
(29).
Drugs of abuse create a signal in the
brain that indicates, falsely, the arrival of a
huge fitness benefit. This changes behav-
ioral propensities so that drug-seeking in-
creases in frequency and displaces adaptive
behaviors. Other novel aspects of the mod-
ern environment have similar effects. For
instance, playing video games also displaces
more adaptive behaviors but via psycholog-
ical instead of direct neurochemical means.
Snacks high in fat, salt, and sugar tend to
displace more nutritious foods in the diet.
We are vulnerable to such fitness-decreas-
ing incentives because our brains are not
designed to cope with ready access to pure
drugs, video games, and snack foods (30).
Hundreds of generations of exposure would
likely shape resistance to their allure and
their deleterious effects. Far less time might
be sufficient, if the genetic deficit in alco-
hol dehydrogenase in many Asian popula-
tions is indeed a product of selection by a
few thousand years of exposure to alcohol
(31). In the meanwhile, the mismatch be-
tween our bodies and our modern environ-
ments is a major cause of behavioral and
medical problems.
This simple perspective leaves many as-
pects of substance abuse unexplained. For
instance, as addiction develops, drug-in-
duced pleasure declines or remains con-
stant, even as cravings increase and mal-
adaptive consequences accumulate, thus
making it clear that the pursuit of pleasure
is an insufficient explanation. One likely
reason is the separation of mammalian
brain reward systems into components that
correspond roughly to “liking” (hedonic
pleasure on receiving a reward) and to
“wanting” (incentive motivation and be-
havioral pursuit of a reward). Although the
nature of these components is just begin-
ning to be understood, they appear to have
different neural substrates. “Liking” of sweet
foods, for example, is mediated by certain
opioid forebrain systems and by brain-stem
systems, whereas “wanting” seems to be me-
diated by ascending mesolimbic dopamine
neurons (12, 32). The separate neural me-
diation of “wanting” may have evolved so
that disparate “likes” for food, sex, and oth-
er incommensurate incentives could be
compared in a common currency of utility
(33). The “liking” system is activated by
receiving the reward, while the “wanting”
system anticipates reward and motivates
instrumental behaviors. When these two
systems are exposed to drugs, the “wanting”
system motivates persistent pursuit of drugs
that no longer give pleasure, thus offer-
ing an explanation for a core paradox of
addiction.
Another aspect of physiology that makes
us susceptible to substance abuse is neural
sensitization–hyperresponsivity in ascend-
ing dopamine projections induced by addic-
tive drugs, through a mechanism gated by
genetic and experiential factors (34, 35).
Such sensitization of brain substrates that
mediate “wanting” can result in compulsive
seeking of a drug that causes neither plea-
sure nor withdrawal (32, 34). Any organism
with a chemically mediated incentive sys-
tem and technological capabilities is intrin-
sically vulnerable to addiction, but these
special design features of vertebrate reward
systems magnify the risks and may explain
the otherwise bizarre phenomenon of ad-
dicts who sacrifice everything else in life to
get drugs that do not reliably bring pleasure,
and who return to drug use even after ex-
tended periods of abstinence.
Important implications follow from the
origin of our vulnerability to drug abuse in
the mismatch between ancient mecha-
nisms and modern environments. From
this evolutionary perspective, individual
variations that increase susceptibility to
drug abuse are better described as quirks
than defects, because they probably had
no deleterious effects in the ancestral en-
vironment. Genetic differences set param-
eters of basic neurobehavioral systems that
are shared by all members of a species.
Nongenetic differences in emotional ex-
perience can also influence susceptibility
to drug use, as demonstrated by the sub-
stantial comorbidity of substance abuse
and posttraumatic stress disorder. The
strong association between emotional
symptoms and susceptibility to addiction
has been studied carefully for smoking,
and the ability of nicotine to relieve these
feelings has been interpreted in a sophis-
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stead of only seeking explanations for sub-
stance abuse in individual differences in
genes, temperament, early experiences, so-
cial conditions, cultural setting, or expo-
sure to drug use, an evolutionary perspec-
tive suggests that we also consider how
these factors interact with the emotional
and behavioral mechanisms that make all
humans vulnerable to substance abuse.
This view encourages therapeutic atten-
tion to the diversity of factors that influ-
ence people’s emotions, such as relation-
ships, social support, social inequity, the
experience of discrimination, and oppor-
tunities or blocked opportunities. There
are reasons why people who are not suc-
ceeding in the social competition are like-
ly to experience positive emotions less
often and negative emotions more often,
take drugs more often, and be less respon-
sive to treatment. This view also suggests
that the mismatch between novel pharma-
cological hyperincentives and ancient
brain mechanisms is likely to worsen with
the discovery of new drugs and new routes
of administration. Finally, it suggests that
we cannot reasonably expect to win the
war on drug abuse, but we can use our
knowledge to develop sensible strategies
for prevention, treatment, and public pol-
icy to manage a problem that is likely to
persist because it is rooted in the fun-
damental design of the human nervous
system.
Drugs that Block
Negative Emotions
An evolutionary perspective also has impli-
cations for drugs that block anxiety, low
mood, and other negative emotions. Psychi-
atrists may soon have drugs that control
emotional suffering just as well as other
drugs can control pain, cough, fever, diar-
rhea, and vomiting. Our understanding of
when and how emotional reactions are use-
ful remains superficial, but understanding
the utility of many physical defenses has
also proved elusive. While most physicians
know that blocking a cough can lead to
death in a patient with pneumonia, and
many know that blocking Shigella-induced
diarrhea leads to slower recovery and more
complications (37), some do not appreciate
the utility of defenses such as fever and low
blood iron levels in infection (38, 39), and
some do not readily differentiate between
manifestations of disease that are aspects of
defenses and those that arise from defects in
the body’s machinery (3). Such difficulties
are magnified in psychiatry. The utility of
anxiety is known but often ignored (40–
42), the utility of jealousy remains contro-
versial (43), and the utility of low mood and
depression is just being considered (44–47).
Quantitative studies that explicitly address
the evolutionary functions of emotions
have just begun. For example, new data
support the function of embarrassment and
guilt in regulating the individual’s hierar-
chical role in a group (48, 49). Our under-
standing of the functional significance of
negative emotions grows slowly, while new
psychotropic drug development races far
ahead at a furious pace. We lack the scien-
tific knowledge about emotions that would
support detailed advice on when these
agents should or should not be used.
We do, however, have several reasons to
think that psychotropic drugs can often be
safe and useful, even if the capacities for
negative emotions are adaptations. First,
there are disease states, in which drugs can
normalize or compensate for pathology, for
example, lithium’s ability to prevent mania.
Second, many normal painful emotional re-
sponses may be no more useful in the mod-
ern environment than the pain caused by
surgery. A panic attack may save the life of
a hunter fleeing from a lion, but cost the life
of a driver on an expressway. Third, the
body has redundant defenses, so blocking
one negative emotion may have few dele-
terious consequences, just as blocking fever
does not necessarily slow the recovery from
infection. Fourth, the biological systems
that regulate defense expression must (ac-
cording to signal detection principles) have
been shaped to express the defensive re-
sponse whenever, on average, it is worth it.
Because many defenses are inexpensive but
protect against potentially fatal threats
whose presence is signaled by unreliable
cues, even an optimal system will produce
many false alarms (4). Like vomiting, which
can eliminate a possibly fatal toxin at the
cost of losing a few hundred calories, fear
and low mood may decrease the tendency
for behaviors that are dangerous or useless.
Finally, the brain was not designed to ben-
efit individuals, but their genes. As Wilson
puts it, “Love joins hate, aggression, fear,
expansiveness, withdrawal, and so on, in
blends designed not to promote the happi-
ness of the individual, but to favor the
maximum transmission of the controlling
genes.” (50)
Such considerations make it possible to
envision, or even to predict, a future in
which drugs will eliminate much normal as
well as pathological emotional suffering,
just as they now relieve physical suffering.
On the other hand, the same factors also
undermine the simplistic view, advocated
by some psychiatrists and pharmaceutical
companies, that intense aversive emotions
almost always result from a brain abnormal-
ity. Some anxiety and low mood has a
primary cause in brain defects, but much
also arises from normal brains and is caused
by an imbalance of brain chemicals only in
the same superficial sense that cough is
caused by excessive neural activity in the
brain locus that controls cough. Further-
more, just because a drug relieves a negative
emotion does not mean that the emotion is
abnormal, nor does it imply that the drug
works by reversing a brain defect. Aspirin,
after all, reduces body temperature only in
people with fever, but fever is a defense
against disease, not a disease itself.
Conclusion
Emotional capacities evolved to improve the
Darwinian fitness of individuals as they seek
resources and avoid dangers. The pursuit of
emotion-associated goals tends to move or-
ganisms up a hedonic and adaptive gradient,
but neurobehavioral systems are designed to
maximize Darwinian fitness, not happiness,
so our pleasures are often fleeting, and we
experience much unnecessary suffering. The
neurochemical mechanisms that mediate
these states confer intrinsic vulnerability to
substance abuse in environments where
drugs are available. A better understanding
of the mechanisms, origins, and functions of
the emotions will enhance our ability to
cope with substance abuse and our wisdom
in making decisions about the therapeutic
use of psychoactive drugs.
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A Range of Research-Based
Pharmacotherapies for
Addiction
Charles P. O’Brien
Modern approaches to the treatment of addiction have been influenced by several
important factors. These include advances in our understanding of the nature of ad-
diction based on longitudinal studies, and progress in elucidating the biological under-
pinnings of addictive behavior. In addition, changes in the system for delivery of services
have begun to shape the way that addiction is treated.
Addiction used to be defined as tolerance
to and physical dependence on a drug of
abuse. Tolerance represents an adaptation
to repeated exposure to a drug such that the
pharmacological response is diminished (1).
Physical dependence is a state manifested
by withdrawal symptoms when drug-taking
is terminated or significantly reduced.
Withdrawal symptoms tend to be a quasi
“rebound” opposite in direction to the ini-
tial drug effects, which begin as the drug
disappears from the body through metabo-
lism and excretion (2). If tolerance and
withdrawal symptoms were the only prob-
lems of addicts, “treatment” would consist
of detoxification, a process that allows the
body to cleanse itself while the individual
receives medication to block withdrawal
symptoms (2). If drug-taking does not re-
sume, homeostatic mechanisms will gradu-
ally readapt to the absence of the drug (3).
We now know that detoxification is, at
best, a first step in beginning treatment and
that achieving the drug-free state is not a
particularly significant accomplishment.
The more difficult aspect is prevention of
relapse to drug-taking behavior.
It is important to note that tolerance
and withdrawal symptoms occur commonly
among nonaddicts who are treated with any
of the common medications to which the
body adapts. These include medications for
high blood pressure, for anxiety, and for
pain. Indeed, the fear of producing “addic-
tion” leads to the undertreatment of pain
(4) even in terminal cancer patients and
may indirectly fuel the debate in the United
States over physician-assisted suicide. Many
patients are allowed to suffer needlessly
when effective pain relief is available, be-
cause of the fear of addiction; thus, suicide
may appear to be the only alternative (5).
If tolerance and physical dependence are
not the core of addiction, then what is the
preferred definition? As the definition has
evolved (1), addiction is a syndrome char-
acterized by compulsive drug-seeking be-
havior that results in an impairment in
social and psychological functions or dam-
age to health. Whereas initial drug use is
voluntary, the individual, once addicted, is
beset by nearly irresistible urges to continue
or to resume drug-taking. Even after detox-
ification and long periods of abstinence,
relapse frequently occurs despite sincere ef-
forts to refrain. People or situations previ-
ously associated with drug use produce in-
voluntary reactions and may provoke a re-
lapse (6). The biological mechanisms for
these apparent reflex patterns are suggested
by data from animal models at the neuro-
chemical level [see a review by Koob and Le
Moal (7), this issue] and the molecular level
[see a review by Nestler and Aghajanian
and (8), this issue]. At the clinical level,
these behavior patterns are manifested by
repeated return to drug-taking behavior
that is often patently self-destructive. A key
point for the clinician to realize is that the
proneness to relapse is based on changes in
brain function that continue for months or
years after the last use of the drug. Of
course, these changes in brain function in-
teract with environmental factors such as
social stress and situational triggers.
Confusion about the diagnosis and prog-
nosis of addiction stems from the fact that by
the time an addicted person presents for
treatment, there are numerous complicating
social and psychological problems that fre-
quently overshadow the addiction process.
The typical patient evolves from drug user,
to abuser, to dependent or addicted person
over a period of years. During this time it is
common for social, occupational, family,
medical, and legal problems to develop. The
Addiction Severity Index (9) contains seven
classes of variables that are assessed in order
to obtain a severity rating. Those patients
who rank at the severe level only on quan-
tity of drugs used and not on other dimen-
sions have a reasonably good prognosis. In
contrast, those with severe psychosocial
complications scoring high in the nondrug
areas have a poor prognosis and are likely to
relapse regardless of their level of drug use
severity (10).
Psychiatric disorders commonly coexist
with addictive disorders. These include anx-
iety disorders, psychotic disorders, and affec-
tive disorders such as depression. Although
some of these so-called “dual diagnosis” cases
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